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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XIX FEBRUARY, 1934 No. 2
AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATISTICAL DATA ON RE-
CEIVERSHIP SUITS FILED IN THE ST. LOUIS
CIRCUIT COURT 1925-1932 INCLUSIVE
BY ISRAEL TREIMAN
INTRODUCTION-PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHOD
The data presented herein was collected for the purpose of aid-
ing the Receivership Survey Committee of the St. Louis Bar As-
sociation in its study of the disposition of receivership suits, and
the administration of estates by receivers, in the Circuit Court
of the City of St. Louis. The cases from which this data has been
extracted fall within the period selected for study by the Com-
mittee, namely, January 1, 1925, to December 31, 1932, and in-
clude all cases in which an application for receivership was filed
within that period, whether or not such application resulted in a
receivership.
During the above-stated period 603 suits involving an appli-
cation for a receivership were filed. Three hundred and thirty, or
about 55 per cent of all the suits, resulted in a receivership ap-
pointment. Of the remaining 273 suits, 237 were terminated
without a receivership appointment and 36 were pending without
a receivership appointment having yet been made at the time
when this data was being gathered. Of the 330 cases in which
receivers were appointed, 190 had been terminated and 140 were
still pending at the time when this data was being gathered. The
following table will indicate the number of receivership suits
filed and the number of receiverships granted, according to years:
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TABLE I. CHRONOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF RECEIVERSHIP
SUITS AND RECEIVERSHIPS GRANTED
YEAR NUMBER OF RECEIVERSHIP SUITS NUMBER OF RECEIVERSHIPS GRANTED
1925 49 36
1926 33 16
1927 61 42
1928 51 24
1929 53 19
1930 91 43
1931 123 66
1932 142 84
The method of collecting this data was as follows: The Minutes
books kept by the clerks of the two Equity divisions of the
St. Louis Circuit Court from January 1, 1925, to December 31,
1932, were examined for the purpose of obtaining the court file
numbers of all cases involving an application for receivership.
After a complete list of these cases had been compiled, the court
file for each case was obtained from the office of the Clerk of the
Circuit Court. A five-page questionnaire was then prepared for
the purpose of compressing into a single and easily digestible
record all of the significant facts that could be gleaned from the
court file of each case. This questionnaire was applied to every
one of the 603 receivership suits filed in the period under survey,
and as many of the questions on each questionnaire answered as
was possible under the circumstances.' Very often a good part
of the questionnaire had to be left unanswered either because no
record of the necessary facts had ever been filed or because the
record was missing from the file when the study was being made.
This lack of available information in the court files was especially
pronounced in matters pertaining to the financial aspects of the
cases. A further obstacle lay in the fact that the court file
ordinarily did not reveal the profession or trade of the receiver,
and that in a number of receiverships involving estates of con-
1 The work of collecting the cases in which a receivership application was
filed, and of filling out the questionnaires, was done mainly by C. S. Cullen-
bine (LL.B. Wash. U. '28) and David Campbell (LL.B. Wash. U. '32). They
were assisted at various times by the following students or former students
of the Law School of Washington University: Herbert K. Moss (LL.B. '33),
Lewis Sigler (LL.B. '34), Sylvia Caraflol (LL.B. '33), and Elizabeth Kausch
(LL.B. '33).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss2/1
DATA ON RECEIVERSHIP SUITS
siderable size the fees paid to the receivers and attorneys in the
case were dispensed by private arrangement or stipulation and
were therefore "off the record." In such cases, wherever possible,
the lacunae were filled in with information obtained either by per-
sonal inquiry or from the testimony presented before the Bar
Association's Committee.
After these 603 questionnaires were completed, the information
contained in them was assembled into tables for analytical study.2
The results of this study form the content of the present paper.3
I. THE CASES IN WHICH NO RECEIVERS WERE APPOINTED
These cases were included in the present survey and subjected
to careful study for the purpose of aiding the Committee in
answering a question that is often heard locally, namely: Is it
generally easy or difficult to obtain a receivership in the Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis? The actual figures show that out
of the 603 receivership applications presented to that court in
the eight-year period under consideration, 237, or about 39 per
cent, did not culminate in a receivership appointment. An
analysis of these 237 cases, however, reveals some rather inter-
esting facts. Only 54 of these cases ever came to a hearing before
the court, and of these 54 cases that came to a hearing, in only 23
did the court actually deny the application! The remaining 214
cases in which no receivers were appointed were simply dismissed
either by stipulation or without stipulation (by voluntary dis-
missal by the plaintiff, or for failure to prosecute, failure to se-
cure costs, etc.). Furthermore, of the 36 cases that were pend-
ing at the time when this survey was begun, without a receiver-
ship having been granted, in 8 cases a hearing had already been
had and the receivership application denied. Adding these
8 cases to the 23 above mentioned, we find, therefore, that out of
the total of 603 suits asking for a receivership the court formally
denied after a hearing only 31 or slightly more than 5 per cent!
2 This work was done mainly by Mrs. Marguerite S. Pyle, A.B. '24 (Wash-
ington University).
9 The judges and lawyers involved in this report will be referred to herein
only by letters of the alphabet. The numbers affixed to the cases mentioned
are not the official court file numbers but simply numbers given them for
identification in the survey. A code translating these letters and numbers
into the actual personalities and cases corresponding therewith was sub-
mitted along with this report to the Receivership Survey Committee of the
St. Louis Bar Association.
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II. DISTRIBUTION OF THE CASES AS TO THE JUDGES INVOLVED
During the period under consideration 23 judges sat at various
times in the two Equity divisions of the Circuit Court. Two of
these judges-Judge A and Judge B-each occupied an Equity
bench for two regular year terms besides short vacation terms.
Twelve were in Equity for one regular year term each, plus short
vacation terms, and the remaining nine occupied the Equity
bench only for vacation terms or less. In drawing any con-
clusions from the number of receiverships allowed by each judge,
it is of course necessary to take into consideration the length of
time occupied by each as an Equity judge. The following table
has therefore been prepared for the purpose of showing the total
number of receiverships granted by each judge in relation to the
total time spent by each in the Equity division. Included in the
TABLE IL ANALYSIS OF RECEIVERSHIP APPOINTMENTS BY
EACH JUDGE
Number Months
onEquityBenches Receivership AverageNum- Per Cent of 330
Judge (counting full Appointments ber Receiver- Receivership
year term as 10 (cases) ships Allowed Cases
months) Per Month
A 22 69 3.136 21%
B 21 64 3.047 19%
C 11 39 3.545 12%
D 12 24 2. 7%
E 12 19 1.583 6%
F 11 19 1.727 6%
G 10 19 1.9 6%
H 11 19 1.727 6%
I 11 15 1.363 411%
J 11 13 1.181 4%
K 10 10 1. 3%
L 11 10 .909 3%
M 2 6 3. 2%
N 2 5 2.5 1/ %
0 10 3 .03 1%
P 2 3 1.5 1%Q 11 2 .018 %0%
R 1 2 2. to
S 1 1 1. vo%
T 2 0 0. 0%
U 1 0 0. 0%
V 1 0 0. 0%
W 1 day 0 0. 0%
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table are also the figures representing the percentage ratio of the
number of receiverships granted by each judge to the total number
of receiverships granted by all the judges.
One of the interesting facts revealed by the above table is that
out of the 23 judges who sat in the Equity divisions 4 judges-
A, B, C, and D-allowed 196 or almost 60 per cent of the total
number of 330 receiverships granted. Furthermore, it will be
seen from the table that when the time element is taken into con-
sideration-the "rate of appointments," or average number of
receiverships allowed per month, of these four judges is about
twice the average "rate of appointments" of the other twelve
judges who sat for at least a full year term in an Equity division.
In connection with this study of the number of receiverships
granted by each judge, it was also found that the greatest number
of receiverships allowed by any judge during one full year term
was 42-by Judge B in 1932. The next greatest was 39 by
Judge C, also in 1932, and next to that 30 by Judge A in 1931.
III. DISTRIBUTION OF THE CASES AS TO THE LAWYERS INVOLVED
This phase of the study was undertaken for the purpose of
throwing some light on two questions that seem to be in the fore-
TABLE III. "LAWYER CONTROL" IN RECEIVERSHIP CASES
Total number of granted receivership cases .............. 330 100%
Cases in which an attorney receiver was appointed ....... 185 56%
Total number of receivers appointed .................... 427 100%
Number of attorney receivers appointed ................ 206 48%
Cases in which an attorney receiver and attorney for re-
ceiver were appointed in a single case ................. 128 38%
Cases in which 2 attorney receivers and attorney for re-
ceiver were appointed in a single case ................. 16 5%
Cases in which 2 attorneys for receiver were appointed .... 89 27%
Cases in which 3 attorneys for receiver were appointed .... 10 3%
Cases in which 4 attorneys for receiver were appointed .... 2 6Ao%
Cases in which an attorney for a party in the suit was ap-
pointed to some office in the receivership .............. 158 47%
Cases in which an attorney for the plaintiff was appointed
to some office in the receivership ...................... 121 36%
Cases in which an attorney for the defendant was appointed
to some office in the receivership ...................... 49 14%
Cases in which an attorney for an intervenor was appointed
to some office in the receivership ..................... 15 4%
Cases in which an attorney for the plaintiff was appointed
attorney for the receiver ............................ 112 33%
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front of current discussions on the administration of receiver-
ships innthe St. Louis Circuit Court, namely: (1) To what extent is
the administration of receiverships "controlled" by the legal pro-
fession in general? and (2) To what extent do a few lawyers or
law firms "predominate" in receivership litigation?
As to the first of these questions, the data as set out in Table IIr
may provide a partial answer.
With regard to the second question, a study was made of all the
lawyers who appeared in one capacity or another in each of the
603 cases that were examined. A careful check was then made
so as to group together those lawyers-who were associated with
each other in the same firm. It was found that there were four
law firms that appeared each in more than 5 per cent of the cases,
and that the cases in which these law firms appeared totalled more
than 31 per cent of the entire number of receivership cases. The
figures on these four law firms are as follows:
TABLE IV. TOTAL APPEARANCES OF FOUR LAW FIRMS AP-
PEARING MOST OFTEN IN RECEIVERSHIP SUITS
FIRDI APPEARING IN CASES PER CENT OF ALL CASES
W 79 appearances in 65 cases 11%
X 60 appearances in 46 cases 7%
y4 50 appearances in 43 cases 7%
Z 48 appearances in 37 cases 6%
A detailed analysis was made of the various capacities in which
these four law firms appeared in the cases. The results are shown
in Table V.
Tables IV and V reveal two noteworthy facts: first, that as
to the total number of cases the margin between Firm W
and the next highest firm (X) is far in excess of the margin be-
tween Firm X and those that follow it on the list; second, that
there is a striking difference between the character of the ma-
jority of the capacities in which Firm X appeared and those in
which the other three firms appeared, to-wit-that whereas
4 The figures on this firm must be qualified somewhat by the fact that the
three lawyers who at one time composed this firm were not associated formally
with each other during a good part of the period covered by this survey, and
that during the year 1932 one of them was not even in the same suite of offices
with the other two.
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TABLE V. ANALYSIS OF CAPACITIES IN WHICH FIRMS W, X, Y,
AND Z APPEARED
AS ATTORNEY FORAS AW-RNEY MR As Re- As Special Total
Firm Corn- De- Inter- Re- ceiver Councilor Appear-plainant fendant venor ceiver ances
W 38 11 7 17 6 79
X 14 28 3 11 3 1 60
22 13 5 6 3 1 50
Z 21 11 1 12 3 48
Firm X appeared as attorney for the defendant twice as often
as it appeared in the capacity of attorney for the complainant, the
other three firms appeared as attorneys for the complainant in a
far greater number of instances than those in which they ap-
peared as attorneys for the defendant. Especially worthy of
notice is the fact that the leading firm (W) appeared as attorney
for the parties seeking the receivership more than three times as
often as it appeared in the capacity of attorney for the parties re-
sisting the suit.
IV. THE RECEIVERS-THEIR NUMBER AND PROFESSIONS
In the 330 cases in which the court granted the application for
a receivership, a total of 427 receivers were appointed. In 89 or
27 per cent of the cases, two or more receivers were appointed in
the same case.
As has already been seen in Table II, supra, 48 per cent of all
the receivers appointed were lawyers by profession. Of the re-
mainder, 39 per cent were or had been in some kind of business,
and about 10 per cent were public officials (including court clerks,
court reporters, etc.). Of special interest is the fact that in only
20 per cent of the cases was a receiver appointed who could be
said to have been in the same general type of business as that of
the defendant company.
For purposes of comparative study, a detailed analysis of the
number and character of the receivership appointments by each
of the four judges-A, B, C, and D-who together granted almost
60 per cent of all the receiverships, is given in Table VI.
' See notation relative to this firm, in footnote 4, supra.
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TABLE VI. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF APPOINTMENTS OF
JUDGES A, B, C, AND D
JUDGE
A B C D Total
Number of cases in which judge appbinted
receivers ............................ 69 64 39 24 196
Number of receivers appointed by judge... 92 83 53 37 265
Number of cases in which judge appointed 2
receivers ............................. 21 11 12 12 56
Number of cases in which judge appointed
3 receivers ........................... 1
Number of cases in which judge appointed-
Attorney receivers .......... .......... 50 30 22 17 119
Businessmen receivers ................. 27 40 19 8 94
Receivers in same business as defendant 13 24 7 5 49
Receivers from defendant company ...... 7 17 6 3 33
Public official receivers ................ 9 2 7 3 21
Medical student ....................... 1 1
Profession unknown .................. 2 2
TABLE VII. DISTRIBUTION AS TO JUDGES OF RECEIVERSHIPS
WITHOUT HEARING
Cases in Which Either the
Total Number of Temporary or the Perma- Per Cent Without
Judge Cases in Which He nent Receiver Was Ap- Hearing, Consent, or
Appointed Receivers pointed Without Hearing, Stipulation
Consent, or Stipulation
A 69 20 31%
B 64 14 20%
C 39 2 5%
D 24 5 29%
E 19 12 781%
F 19 3 21%
G 19 7 42%
H 19 2 10%
I 15 7 60%
J 13 5 46%
K 10 2 20%
L 10 5 50%
M 6 2 33%
N 5 0 20%
0 3 2 33%
P 3 0 0%Q 2 1 50%
R 2 01 0%
S 1 0 0%
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V. APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVERS WITHOUT A HEARING
In 89 of the 330 cases in which a receivership was ordered, the
court appointed either a temporary or a permanent receiver with-
out a hearing and not by consent or stipulation. The judges who
made such appointments and the number of such appointments
made by each are given in Table VII.
VI. FEES AND COSTS
A study of fees and costs was undertaken for the following pur-
poses: (1) To determine what items account for the bulk of the
TABLE VIII. COMPARISON OF FEES AND COSTS WITH ASSETS
REALIZED IN 20 CASES INVOLVING REALIZED ASSETS OF
LESS THAN $1,000
V o4
19 $ 25 $ $$ 46 $ 71 $192 37
24 100 ................. 133 233 325 7230 37 ................ 13 50 257 19
40 39 ........ 40 66 145 205 71
50 ..... 350 261 611 807 76
70 10 ............... 33 83 211 39
90 235 235 ........ 355 825 825 100
98 29 29 35 83
129 75. 75. 2 127 502 631 80
169 250 ................. 73 323 991 35
190 227 ................. 71 298 476 63
232 35 150 ........ 70 255 255 100
199 175 ................. 111 286 710 40
289 45 45 ........ 160 250 250 100
317 125 ........ 200 76 401 658 61
362 40 ........ 77 88 205 205 100
480 60 ................. 61 121 121 100
551 142 ........ 100 130 372 568 65
637 ......................... 76 76 125 61
651 200 ................. 74 274 427 64
Totals$505 $992 $2,053 $5,410 $8,274 66%
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administrative expenses involved In receiverships; (2) To de-
termine the relative size of the fees and costs in comparison with
the assets realized; and (3) To observe how certain law firms have
fared in respect to the fees allowed them. It is believed that the
tables included in this section will throw some light on each of
these inquiries.
As has already been observed, the investigation of the finan-
TABLE IX. COMPARISON OF FEES AND COSTS WITH ASSETS
REALIZED IN 26 CASES INVOLVING REALIZED ASSETS OF AN
AMOUNT BETWEEN $1,000 AND $5,000
7 $55 10 513 $ 7*$,35 2
29 50 10 0 .... W1 6 100 2
..0
42 400 100 25~0 37 ,2 147 8
0 0
84 500 ...... 1,02 51.203 345 66 IV . 0... 0000 0  V 91
7 $ 55 $ $100 $123 $ 278 $1,135 25
29 50 100 ........ 117 267 1,000 27
34 225 .......7 536 336 2,068 11
42 400 100 250 374 1,124 1,487 80
84 500 ......... 1,020 512 2,032 3,451 60
86 443 ................. 140 583 1,177 50
122 400 300 ........ 95 795 3,537 22
133 150 175............ 162 487 1,170 42
154 714 914........ 122 1,750 1,750 100
164 350 ................. 50 400 1,519 26
170 500 400 ........ 41 941 4,987 20
191 563 250 ....... 26 839 1,300 65
202 100 100 ........ 46 246 2,794 90
303 1,000 ................ 25 1,025 1,357 76
337 312...........450 215 977 1,223 80
343 200 300 200 180 880 4,018 22
380 150................. .50 200 4,822 4
384 500 500 250 200 1,450 2,990 50
390 500 1,250 ........ 64 1,814 2,643 70
450 500 100...........259 859 4,042 21
459 300 300...........184 784 3,970 20
486 80...........375 57 512 1,269 40
530 156......... .......... 43 199 1,080 19
584 250 210 ..... 41 501 1,473 34
590 310 150...........554 1,014 1,023 98
596 400 300 400 99 1,199 1,981 60
Totals $9,108 $5,524 $3,045 $3,815 $21,492 $59,266 36%
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cial aspects of the cases was seriously hampered by the fact that
in a great number of cases information as to the necessary facts
was missing from the court file. In only 85 of the 190 cases in
which a receivership had been granted and which had been
terminated at the time when this survey was begun, was the avail-
able information sufficiently complete and specific to enable a satis-
factory study to be made of the various fees and costs and their
relationship to the assets realized in the particular case. It is
believed, however, that the data contained in these 85 cases fur-
nishes a fairly sufficient basis on which to make a profitable study.
TABLE X. COMPARISON OF FEES AND COSTS WITH ASSETS
REALIZED IN 22 CASES INVOLVING REALIZED ASSETS OF AN
AMOUNT BETWEEN $5,000 AND $25,000
oN
5 0
a 0a
2 $1,300 $1,200 $ $ 215 $2,715 $ 6,956 40
20 .. 750 ......... 350 1,100 5,520 20
73 2,000........ 2,300 1,923 6,223 22,766 27
146 500 400 750 69 1,719 6,382 29
150 1,200 700 ........ 1,306 3,206 10,417 30
157 1,500 ................ 113 1,613 9,889 16
173 300 300 250 46 896 9,701 9
206 1,000 ........ 400 169 1,569 5,370 30
219 400 550 450 125 1,525 7,915 20
242 1,200 2,000 ........ 481 3,681 11,579 32
258 71 ................ 25 96 9,222 1
259 7,500 1,000 ........ 325 8,825 10,906 81
262 1,500 750 ........ 149 2,399 12,355 20
307 2,949 350 300 43 3,642 11,932 31
319 2,000 2,000 ........ 130 4,130 10,164 40
391 500 1,300 ....... 36 1,836 6,744 27
402 500 2,000 300 90 2,890 12,141 24
426 750 200 500 225 1,675 9,667 17
466 300 200 100 205 805 5,596 14
575 625 750 ........ 79 1,454 8,015 18
577 850 500 ....... 59 1,409 7,510 19
614 800 800 400 371 2,371 24,521 10
Totals $27,745 $15,750 $5,750 $6,534 $55,779 $225,268 25%
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TABLE XI. COMPARISON OF FEES AND COSTS WITH ASSETS
REALIZED IN 9 CASES INVOLVING REALIZED ASSETS OF AN
AMOUNT BETWEEN $25,000 AND $100,000
r 3
10 $10,900 $ 3,000 $2,231 $2,259 $18,390 $38,825 47
27 4,000 2,750 ........ 125 6,875 67,912 9
28 19,000 19,000 ........ 2,671 40,671 75,403 53
136 1,500 2,500 245 120 4,365 34,742 13
179 3,500 3,000 1,000 268 7,768 60,420 13
306 5,300 4,000 ........ 1,458 10,758 32,733 33
368 4,250 4,250 6,000 475 14,975 60,907 24
394 6,350 5,250 ........ 1,579 13,179 59,472 26
589 1,600 1,600 400 329 3,929 40,267 10
Totals $56,400 $45,350 $9,876 $9,284 $120,910 $470,681 26%
Tables VII, IX, X, XI, XII, and XIII, are based upon the data ex-
tracted from these 85 cases. It will be noted that in making this
study of the fees and costs, and their comparison with the assets
realized, the cases were divided into 5 groups, the division being
based upon the amount of realized assets involved: the first
group including all cases in which the realized assets amounted
to less than $1,000, the second group including all cases in which
the realized assets were between $1,000 and $5,000, the third
group including all cases in which the realized assets were be-
tween $5,000 and $25,000, the fourth group including all cases in
which the realized assets were between $25,000 and $100,000,
and the fifth group including all cases in which the realized assets
amounted to more than $100,000. This grouping of the cases
was adopted because a preliminary examination indicated that the
ratio between fees and costs and assets realized showed a wide
variation dependent upon the relative size of the assets involved.
A digest of Tables VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII is given in
Table XIII.
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TABLE XII. COMPARISON OF FEES AND COSTS WITH ASSETS
REALIZED IN 8 CASES INVOLVING REALIZED ASSETS OF AN
AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF $100,000
k0, 1
z ~
15 $11,500 $ 9,500 $ 1,500 $ 1,664 $24,164 $136,696 18
60 11,850 3,950 150 413 16,363 206,360 8
116 15,000 20,000 15,000 3,661 53,661 237,638 22
330 15,300 3,250 5,500 740 24,790 127,486 19
376 20,000 4,500 63,150 1,740 89,390 275,989 30
377 16,000 12,886 5,500 7,398 41,784 425,976 10
435 7,000 2,500 6,704 2,318 18,522 152,397 12
498 4,000 5,000 1,500 2,354 12,854 108,879 11
Totals $100,650 $61,586 $99,004 20,288 $281,528 $1,671,421 17%
A special study was made of all the reported fees received in re-
ceivership cases during the period under survey, by the four law
firms (W, X, Y, and Z) mentioned in III supra.6 Tables XIV, XV
and XVI are based upon this study.7
VIL FINANCIAL RESULTS TO STOCKHOLDERS, BONDHOLDERS, AND
CREDITORS
Perhaps the most striking fact revealed by a study of the finan-
cial aspects of the 190 receivership cases which had been brought
to a close at the time when this survey was begun is that, with but
6 All figures on firm Y must be taken subject to the qualification noted in
footnote 4, supra.
7 The figures set forth in these tables probably do not represent all of the
fees actually received in receivership litigation by the law firms mentioned
therein. Only such fees are included as were either set forth in the court
file of the case or were divulged by reliable and undisputed testimony before
the Receivership Survey Committee of the St. Louis Bar Association. In a
good many cases, however, it was apparent that compensation was paid to
the lawers involved by private agreement and stipulation, concerning which
no specific information as to amounts received could be obtained.
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TABLE XIII. COMPARISON OF FEES AND COSTS
REALIZED IN 85 CLOSED CASES
WITH ASSETS
= = _ _ _ - =?S
S.. c. .
A
*J ..
20 cases in-
volving assets
of less than
$1,000 $ 1,860 $ 505 992 $ .2,053 $ 5,410 $ 8,274 66%
26 cases in-
volving assets
from $1,000 to
$5,000 9,108 5,524 3,045 3,815 21,492 59,266 36%
22 cases in-
volving assets
from $5,000 to
$25,000 27,745 15,750 5,750 6,534 55,779 225,268 25%
9 cases involv-
ingassetsfrom
$25,000 to
$100,000 56,400 45,350 9,876 9,284 120,910 470,681 26%5
8 cases involv-
ing assets over
$100,000 100,650 61,586 99,004 20,288 281,528 1,671,421 17%
Totals $195,763 $128,715 $118,667 $41,974 $485,119 $2,434,910
Percentages in
relation to as-
sets realized 8% 5% 5% 2% 20%1
one exceptions there is no record of any payment having been
made to stockholders, or bondholders. This fact acquires added
significance when considered in conjunction with the data as to
the final dispositions made in these cases (see Sec. VIII, infra),
8 Case No. 116, in which a receiver was placed in charge of a hospital. The
receiver sold the hospital, and out of the proceeds paid off all creditors and,
in addition, distributed $138,226 among the trust-certificate holders who were
the beneficiaries of the common-law trust under which the hospital had been
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss2/1
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TABLE XIV. ANALYSIS OF REPORTED FEES RECEIVED BY LAW
FIRMS W, X, Y, AND Z IN CLOSED CASES
FIRMS
W X Y Z
Fees received as receivers ............. $10,100 $ 500 $ 200 $ 350
Fees received as attorneys for receivers.. 21,500 9,300 10,041 1,975
Fees received as attorneys for petitioners 63,300 450 4,500 916
Fees received in other capacities ....... 1,000 250 - 300
Total fees received .................... $95,900 $10,500 $14,741 $3,541
Number cases in which fees were reported 9 6 6 6
Average amount of fees per case ....... $10,655 $1,750 $2,456 $590
and especially in view of the relatively large number of cases in
which the receivers reported a sale of all the assets of the de-
fendant and a winding-up of the business, and, on the other hand,
the relatively small number of cases in which the receivers re-
ported that a reorganization of the business had been ac-
complished.
TABLE XV. ANALYSIS OF REPORTED FEES RECEIVED BY LAW
FIRMS W, X, Y, AND Z IN PENDING CASES
FIRMS
W X Y Z
Fees received as receivers ............. $ $ 750 $ $
Fees received as attorneys for receivers.. 22,500 850 ....... 1,850
Fees received as attorneys for petitioners 1,450 400 1,850 1,425
Fees received in other capacities ....... 1,466 6,574 10,475 1,550
Total fees received .................... $25,416 $8,574 $12,325 $4,825
Number cases in which fees were reported 11 3 4 7
Average amount of fees per case ....... $2,310 $2,858 $3,081 $689
For the purpose of seeing how the creditors fared in these cases,
a study was made of all the cases in which the receivers reported
some payment to creditors, whether secured or unsecured. The
number of cases in which the receivers reported some payment
to secured or unsecured creditors amounted to 47 (out of 190).
built and operated. The distribution to these certificate holders represented
a return of about 29 per cent on their original investment. (See summary of
this case in Sec. X, infra.)
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TABLE XVI. ANALYSIS OF REPORTED FEES RECEIVED BY LAW
FIRMS W, X, Y, AND Z IN CLOSED AND PENDING CASES
FIRMS
W X Y Z
Fees received as receivers ............. $ 10,100 $ 1,250 $ 200 $ 350
Fees received as attorneys for receivers.. 44,000 10,150 10,041 3,825
Fees received as attorneys for petitioners 64,750 850 6,350 2,341
Fees received in other capacities ....... 2,466 6,824 10,475 1,850
Total fees received .................... $121,316 $19,074 $27,066 $8,366
Number cases in which fees were reported 20 9 10 13
Average amount of fees per case ....... $Q,066 $2,119 $2,707 $644
As in the case of the study made of fees and costs in comparison
to assets realized, the cases were grouped according to the
amounts involved. The grouping for this study was under three
heads, to-wit: (1) Cases in which the unsecured claims amounted
to less than $10,000: in this group were also included those cases
in which no unsecured claims were reported but which did in-
volve some secured claims; (2) Cases in which the unsecured
claims amounted to more than $10,000 but less than $100,000;
(3) Cases in which the unsecured claims amounted to more than
$100,000. Tables XVII, XVIII, and XIX contain an analysis of
the payments made on claims in the 47 cases mentioned, each of
the above groups being treated separately. Table XX presents a
comparison and summary of the totals in each of the first three
tables.
VIII. THE INTEREST AND PURPOSE OF THE PETITIONER
A study was made of the petitions that were filed in all the
cases in which a receivership was granted for the purpose of ex-
amining the'interest and purpose which the petitioner claimed
entitled him to sue for a receivership. This study was undertaken
mainly to determine to what extent the local circuit courts have
been following the established law in this state with regard to the
interest and purpose which the petitioner must show in order to
enable him to ask for a receivership. Before discussing the re-
sults of this study, therefore, a brief -reference should be made to
the law regulating this matter as laid down by the Supreme Court
of this state.
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TABLE XVII. PAYMENTS MADE TO CREDITORS IN 25 CASES IN
WHICH THE UNSECURED CLAIMS AMOUNTED TO LESS THAN
$10,000. (Including cases in which no unsecured claims, and only some
secured claims, were reported.)
PAYMENTS ON PAYMENTS ON
Cale Total UNSECURED CLAIMS Total SECURED CLAIMS
Number Unsecured Secured
Claims Amount PerCent Claims Amount PerCent
7 $7,500 $3,250 19 $ 524 $ 524 100
20 1,877 1,877 100
29 .... ,5 1,55 100
42 2,601 362 14
50 399 ... 15 i95 100
84 1,907 80 42 600 600 100
98 554 .. .
116 500 500 100 ",000 7,000 100
129 411 ...
170 6,181 3,15 52
191 1,350 1,350 100 ...... ...... ...
208 1,027 1,027 100 ..
262 6,598 4,179 63 280 280 i0
288 2,875 143 6 ...... ...... ...
317 1,876 250 13 ...... ...... ...
340 1,997 36 2
348 9,893 3,671 27 387 387 10
362 2,419 ...... ...
384 ......... ,5 4
391 ...... ... 77,700 4,838 6
445 2,921 .....
450 3,746 1,835 49 i108 i08 iOO
459 2,184 287 13 ....... ...... ...
520 98 ...... ... ...... ...... ...
551 5,873 ...... ... ...... ...... ...
Total $64,287 $22,720 35% $92,910 $15,954 17%
In the first place, "a person maintaining the suit must have a
beneficial interest to be enforced or preserved." 9 In line with this
rather obvious requirement, the Supreme Court has held that
even a stockholder may not maintain a suit for a receivership
where his only interest is that of a stockholder and the defendant
company is insolvent, because in such a case there is no possible
benefit that can accrue to him.1 0 A fortiori, if the petitioner sues
only as a stockholder and in his petition alleges that the defendant
company is insolvent, he "states himself out of court." 11 The only
g State ex rel. Kopke v. Mulloy, 329 Mo. 1, 43 S. W. 2d 806.2o State ex rel. Kopke v. Mulloy, supra.
1 State ex rel. Kopke v. Mulloy, supra.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
TABLE XVIII. PAYMENTS TO CREDITORS IN 18 CASES IN WHICH
THE UNSECURED CLAIMS WERE BETWEEN $10,000 AND $100,000
PAYMENTS ON PAYMENTS ON
Case Total UNSECURED CLAIMS Total SECURED CLAIMS
Number Unsecured Secured
Claims Amount PerCent Claims Amount PerCent
2 $17,030 $ 3,250 19 $ 524 $ 524 100
28 34,129 34,129 100 ...... ...... ...
190 50,000* • •66
242 47,678 2,582 5 2,496 2,496 100
257 10,000* 5,000* 50 531 531 100
306 33,356 10,114 30 287 287 100
307 27,781 6,945 25 ...... ...... ...
344 20,715 10,358 50 ....... ......
368 65,586 19,675 30 ...... ...... ...
383 10,760 .. .
402 19,000 8,550.45
426 26,587 7,292 28 ...... ...... ...
480 14,990 .. .
557 20,023 5,005 25
575 10,390 6,281 60 198 198 100
589 24,503 2,408 10 1,530 1,530 100
614 39,886 20,166 51 ...... ...... ...
15 87,636 87,636 100 ...... ...... ...
Total $560,050 $229,391 40% $5,566 $5,566 100%
TABLE XIX. PAYMENTS TO CREDITORS IN 4 CASES IN WHICH
THE UNSECURED CLAIMS AMOUNTED TO MORE THAN $100,000
PAYMENTS ON PAYMENTS ON
Case Total UNSECURED CLAIMS Total SECURED CLAIMS
Number Unsecured Secured
Claims Amount PerCent Claims Amount PerCent
10 $237,808 $16,170 7 $ $
73 112,204 10,469 9 555 555 i0
179 116,784 23,054 20
447 102,791 2,056 2 22,200 22,200 10
Total $569,587 $51,749 9% 22,755 22,755 100%
persons who can possibly benefit from the receivership where the
company is insolvent are obviously the creditors. In view of this
limitation on the right of a stockholder to sue for a receivership,
it is immaterial that there has been "mismanagement" on the part
of the officers conducting the business.
12
12 State ex rel. Kopke v. Mulloy, supra.
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TABLE XX. COMPARISON AND SUMMARY OF PAYMENTS TO
CREDITORS IN 47 CLOSED CASES IN WHICH RECEIVERS RE-
PORTED A PAYMENT TO CREDITORS. (Digest of Tables XVII,
XVIII, and XIX.)
PAYMENTS ON UN- PAYMENTS ON
Type of Case as to Total Un- SECURED CLAIMS Total SECURED CLAIMS
Amount of Claims secured Secured
Claims Amount Per Cent Claims Amount Per Cent
Less than $10,000
of unsecured claims $ 64,287 $ 22,720 35 $ 92,910 $15,954 17
Between $10,000
and $100,000 of un-
secured claims ... 560,050 229,391 40 5,586 5,586 100
More than $100,000
of unsecured claims 569,587 51,749 9 22,755 22,755 100
Totals $1,193,924 $303,860 26% $121,251 $44,295 36%
In the second place, with regard to creditors, it is the accepted
rule that in the absence of special statutes-
"A general or simple contract creditor who has not reduced
his claim to judgment, who has no right or interest in, or lien
upon, the property of the debtor, and whose interest or posi-
tion does not differ from that of any other ordinary creditor,
has no standing to obtain the appointment of a receiver of
such property." 13
This rule forbidding simple creditors from obtaining a re-
ceivership
"is applicable, although defendant is disposing of his prop-
erty; and the mere fact of the insolvency of the debtor, or an
allegation of fraud, will not change the rule."14  (Italics
mine.)
In the third place, the Missouri Supreme Court has emphati-
cally and unequivocally stated on numerous occasions that if the
sole purpose of the petitioner in seeking the receivership is to
wind up and liquidate the business of the defendant, a receivership
should not be granted. As said by the Supreme Court in State
ex rel. Kopke v. Mulloy:
13 53 Corpus Juris 29; and see Miller v. Perkins, 154 Mo. 629, in which the
Supreme Court of Missouri very emphatically applied this general rule.
14 53 Corpus Juris 29-30.
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"The law is that, except in very exceptional cases, if any,
proceedings by receivership are not maintained for the sole
purpose of taking over, liquidating, or closing out a business,
returning, not the business and property, but the residue, if
any, in money to the owners. A receivership is merely an
ancillary proceeding in aid of a pending suit involving prop-
erty in order to preserve such property as far as practical
till the termination of the suit in order that it may then go as
the court directs. . 'It is fundamental that there is
neither in law nor in equity any such thing as a plain receiver-
ship action, i. e., an action in which a receiver is the only
desideratum.' . . . A court of equity has no power to dis-
solve a corporation and wind up its business by a receiver-
ship. And if the appointment of a receiver and investing
him with power to collect the debts of the corporation, as-
semble and dispose of all the property, pay its debts, and
distribute the residue, if any, to the stockholders, does not
work a dissolution of the corporation, then what would?"
(Italics mine.)
Bearing in mind these requirements and limitations that
have been laid down by the Supreme Court of Missouri, let us now
examine the 190 closed cases and the 140 pending cases in which
the St. Louis Circuit Courts appointed receivers during the period
under survey.
In 106 of these 330 cases the suit was brought at the instance of
a petitioner who described himself as being solely a stockholder.
In 35 of these cases the stockholder alleged in his petition that the
company was insolvent! In many of these cases it is not very
clear whether the term "insolvent" was used in the sense of a
temporary inability to meet current obligations or in the bank-
ruptcy sense of total assets being worth less than the total lia-
bilities. All doubt as to the real condition of the defendant in
these cases, however, is dispelled by a consideration of the facts
set forth in the preceding section dealing with results to stock-
holders, bondholders and creditors. It was there seen that with
but one exception in 190 closed cases there is no record of any
payment having ever been made to stockholders. The tables in
that section also indicated that in the vast majority of these cases
the creditors suffered substantial losses in the final liquidation of
the assets. It is therefore reasonably safe to surmise that in a
great number of cases receiverships have been granted at the in-
stance of stockholders not only where the evidence could well
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have shown, but even where the petition itself asserted, that the
financial condition of the company was such that the petitioner
could not possibly have had any beneficial interest to be enforced
or preserved through a receivership.
Coming now to the rule forbidding simple creditors from peti-
tioning for a receivership, it was found that in 76 cases or almost
one-fourth of the total number of cases in which a receivership
was granted the suit was instituted at the behest of a simple, un-
secured contract creditor! (The total number of creditor-filed
suits resulting in receivership was 135, of which 59 were suits
filed by judgment creditors, secured creditors, bondholders, me-
chanics-lien holders, etc.) The most frequent allegation in these
suits filed by simple creditors is that many other creditors' suits
are being threatened and that unless a receivership is granted
for the purpose of "staying such suits" a forced liquidation of the
assets will be necessary with resultant impairment of the value
of such assets and inequitable advantages to a few creditors over
the rest of the creditors.
With regard to the rule forbidding a court of equity from enter-
taining a receivership suit instituted solely for the purpose of
winding-up and liquidating a business, and not as an ancillary
remedy in aid of a pending suit, it was found that in 35 cases the
petitioner expressly stated that the receivership was sought for
the sole purpose of winding-up and liquidating the business. But
it was further found that whether the petitioner expressly stated
that to be his sole purpose or not, the subsequent history of the
case in the vast majority of instances clearly showed that a
winding-up and final liquidation was, if not the actual purpose,
certainly the inevitable outcome of the receivership. Out of the
190 receivership cases that were terminated at the time when
this survey was begun, 156 contain some information as to the
manner of the final disposition of the case. Of these 156 cases,
45 were dismissed by plaintiff or settled by stipulation, and in 14
the receivership appointment was subsequently reversed. Of the
remaining 97 cases, 14 finally wound up in the bankruptcy court
and in 3 cases the assets were transferred to a federal receiver.
In all, therefore, there were 80 cases which were reported as
having been brought to a final status by the receiver in the Cir-
cuit Court. In 63 or more than 75 per cent of these cases the final
outcome was a sale of the assets and a liquidation of the business.
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There were only 9 cases in which the receiver reported a reorgani-
zation of the business, and but 8 cases in which the business or the
assets remaining were turned back to the defendant.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS DATA
The following miscellaneous data was also collected in the
belief that it might be of some interest to the committee:
A. Operation of Business by Receivers
In 57 of the 190 receivership cases that had been closed when
this survey was commenced, the receivers reported that they had
continued to operate the business. Unfortunately, the informa-
tion in the files as to the financial results of such operations is very
scanty. In at least 15 of the 57 cases, however, the receivers re-
ported that their operation of the business resulted in a loss, the
total amount of the reported loss in these cases being $69,859.
In 21 cases the receivers reported a profit, the total amount of the
reported profit in these cases being $54,980.
B. Bonds
A study was made of the receivers' bonds that were filed in the
cases for the purpose of noting the frequency with which certain
bonding companies appear in the cases as well as the frequency
with which they appear in cases handled by the same judge. Of
the total of 330 cases in which receivers were appointed (closed
and pending cases), bonds were filed in 302 cases. (The cases
in which no bonds were filed were mostly cases in which the re-
ceiver appointed was a public official, like the State Superintend-
ent of Insurance or the Commissioner of Finance, whose appoint-
ment without bond was authorized under the law.) In all but
four of the cases the bond was written by a bonding company.
Table XXI shows how the bonds were distributed among the
various companies, together with the amounts of such bonds.
In connection with this study of the bonds, it was also found
that Company A appeared in 71 per cent of the cases handled by
Judge A, that the same company appeared in 44 per cent of the
cases handled by Judge B, in 23 per cent of the cases handled by
Judge C, in 31 per cent of the cases handled by Judge D, and in
73 per cent of the cases handled by Judge I. The appearances
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TABLE XXI. DISTRIBUTION OF BONDS AS TO COMPANIES WRIT-
ING THE BONDS
Number Cases in
Company Which Company Percentage Total Amount of Average Size of
Wrote the Bonds of All Cases Bonds Written Bond Per Case
A 148 49 $1,617,500 $10,929
B 45 14 2,015,000 44,777
C 39 12 588,000 15,076
D 15 4 207,000 13,800
E 12 3 229,500 19,125
F 9 2 200,500 22,277
G 9 2 53,000 5,888
H 6 1 51,000 10,200
I 6 1 280,500 46,750
All Other
Companies 32 10 466,500 14,578
of the other companies with respect to cases handled by the same
judge did not show any such concentration as the appearances
of Company A, with the possible exception of Company B, which
appeared in 43 per cent of the cases handled by Judge C.
C. The Duration of Receiverships
Because of the great variety of purposes for which receiver-
ships are sought and the consequent variety of functions which
must be exercised by the receivers, it would be vain to try to
deduce from the records any conclusions as to the length of time
that is consumed in the administration of the "typical" receiver-
ship case. The following figures may, nevertheless, be of some
interest.
In the group of cases that had been terminated when this sur-
vey was begun, it was found that the duration of temporary re-
ceiverships ranged from a few days to several years, the esti-
mated average being slightly more than 6 months. In one case,
the temporary receivership lasted 41/2 years! The duration of
permanent receiverships in the same group of cases ranged from
less than a month to several years, the average being slightly
more than 13 months. In one case the receivership lasted 61/2
years!
Coming to the group of cases in which a receivership had been
granted but the case was still pending when this survey was be-
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gun, it was found that in two cases the receivership had been in
effect since 1925, the first year of the period under survey; that in
two other cases the receivership had been in effect since 1926;
in four cases since 1927; in five cases since 1928; in six cases since
1929; in 20 cases since 1930; in 38 cases since 1931; and that in
the remaining 63 cases the receivership had been granted during
the last year of the period under survey-1932.
Perhaps the most significant fact observed in connection with
the duration of these receiverships was that in a good number of
them the active administration and functions of the receivers had
apparently ceased long before either the termination of the case
or, in pending cases, the time when thtis survey was begun. In
most of these cases it was difficult to understand the reason for
the prolongation of the case after the activity of the receiver had
ceased.
D. Receiverships by Consent
In 111 cases (more than one-third of all the cases in which a
receivership was granted) it was found that ahe defendant con-
sented to the appointment of receivers. Especially interesting is
the fact that these "consent receiverships" are much more numer-
ous among the recent cases than among the older ones. Thus,
in the group of 190 cases that had been terminated when this
survey was begun the number of consents was found to be 47, or
slightly less than one-fourth of the total number. On the other
hand, in the group of pending receiverships--which for the most
part were cases instituted more recently than those in the closed
group-the number of consent receiverships jumped to 64 out of
140, or more than 45 per cent of the total number.
E. Appraisers
A study of the appointments of appraisers-and the fees allowed
them revealed nothing of special significance except, perhaps, the
fact that the frequency of such appointments and the size of the
fees tend to increase in the more recent cases. Thus, in the
group of 190 closed cases appraisers were appointed in 33, or
17 per cent of the cases, whereas in the 140 cases still pending 34,
or almost 25 per cent, already have a record of appointment of
appraisers. And whereas in the former group the average size
of the appraisers' fee is less than $100, in the latter group the
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fees allowed to date show an average of more than $500. Ex-
amples of large appraisers' fees are to be found in the following
cases:
Case No. 404, in which Judge B allowed a fee of $2,400 to three
appraisers, one of whom was a lawyer, for appraising the
assets of a real estate mortgage and promotion company.
The appraised value of the assets amounted to $1,219,205.
The total receipts to date from all sources amounted to
$179,850.
Case No. 509, in which Judge C allowed a fee of $2,700 to three
appraisers for appraising the assets of a manufacturing
company. The appraised value of the assets amounted to
$646,675. According to their report, the appraisers spent 28
days making their appraisement. Motions were filed to set
aside the allowance on the grounds that it was excessive and
that no provision was included in the receivership decree for
such an appraisement to be made.
Case No. 111, in which Judge 0 allowed a fee of $3,000 to three
appraisers for a $644,913 appraisement on the assets of a
real estate loan and investment company.
Case No. 498, in which Judge C allowed a fee of $1,500 to three
appraisers for a $1,049,715 appraisement on the assets of a
hotel company.
X. SELECTED CASES DESERVING SPECIAL ATTENTION
In the course of this statistical survey a number of cases came
under observation that seemed to merit special attention in con-
nection with the particular lines of inquiry pursued in the survey.
A summary of the noteworthy facts in each of these cases is given
below so as to enable the Committee more conveniently to make
specific reference to some of these cases in its final report, should
it so desire.
A. CLOSED CASES
Case No. 10: The file in this case is completely missing, with the
exception of the petition of the complainant, petitions of
the receiver for compensation and the appointment of a
special counsel, and the clerk's wrapper containing the
minutes of the case. From these meager records, however,
it appears that the receiver realized a total of $38,825, out of
which the receiver-an attorney by profession-received
$10,900 for his services. An additional $7,490 was paid out
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for other fees and costs, leaving a balance of $20,435 to
be distributed among unsecured creditors whose claims
amounted to $237,808.
Case No. 24: This case involved a small partnership in the retail
grocery business. The suit was for a dissolution of the busi-
ness and an accounting, with a prayer for the appointment
of a receiver to sell and distribute the assets. The defend-
ant consented to the receivership. The receiver was ap-
pointed on January 14, 1925, and reported that he sold the
business for $325 shortly after his appointment. The sale
was approved by the court on January 26, 1925, leaving noth-
ing further to be done except to distribute the proceeds of the
sale and file a final report. Nevertheless, the case remained
in court for more than six years.
Case No. 28: This case involved a receivership for an insurance
company. The petition was filed by the State Superintendent
of Insurance and alleged mismanagement of business, viola-
tion of insurance laws, and dangerous impairment of the
company's assets. Although a general denial was filed, a
receivership was granted without a hearing but on stipula-
tion of the parties. Although the defendant company had
previously made an assignment of all its assets to another in-
surance company, which was under a receivership in the
federal courts, and although the chief function of the state
receivership was to satisfy a few small claims against the de-
fendant company and turn the balance of the assets over to
the federal receiver-most of these assets being already on
deposit with the State Superintendent of Insurance-
Judge P, nevertheless, appointed three receivers and two at-
torneys for receivers in this case. The receivers appointed
were: the Superintendent of Insurance; the lawyer who had
been appointed receiver of the assignee company in the fed-
eral courts; and a person who had served as court stenog-
rapher for Judge P. The last two receivers were allowed
$19,000 for their services jointly, and the two attorneys for
receivers were allowed an equal amount.
Case No. 42: The defendant in this case was a company manu-
facturing food products. The petitioner was a creditor hold-
ing unsecured claims of $400 and a small number of shares
of stock in the company. The total claims against the com-
pany amounted to $2,600. On default of the defendant,
Judge E appointed a lawyer as receiver as well as an attor-
ney for the receiver. The total assets realized in the case
amounted to $1,487, out of which the attorney-receiver was
allowed $400, the attorney for the receiver $100 and an addi-
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tional $250 for his services as attorney for the petitioner.
The total fees and costs amounted to $1,124 or about 80 per
cent of the total assets realized.
Case No. 84: Although the case involves a rather small estate,
the fees received by the attorneys who appeared in it are of
special interest. The total assets realized were $3,451. Out
of this, the receiver-an attorney by profession-was al-
lowed $500 for his services, the attorneys for the plaintiff
were allowed $500, and the attorneys for the defendant were
also allowed an equal amount. The total fees and costs were
$2,032, or about 60 per cent of the total assets realized.
Case No. 90: An excellent example of fees and costs "eating up"
all the assets. The suit was brought at the instance of a
stockholder and alleged insolvency and impairment of the
assets of the defendant company (operating taxicabs). The
intervening parties alone asserted claims of over $14,000.
The estate was hopelessly insolvent, as shown by the fact
that the total assets realized amounted to $825. A lawyer
was appointed receiver, and an attorney for the receiver ap-
pointed at the same time. The fees and costs consumed the
entire amount of assets realized. The case unquestionably
belonged in the Bankruptcy Court, rather than in a court of
Equity.
Case No. 116: In this case a large hospital was put in receiver-
ship. The receiver appointed to operate the hospital in place
of the original trustees was the local Collector of Revenue
(appointed by Judge B). After operating the hospital at a
considerable loss for a period of several months, the receiver
succeeded in selling it for about $213,000. Other receipts
made the total assets realized amount to $237,638. For his
services, the receiver was allowed $15,000, and an equal
amount was allowed to the law firm representing the plain-
tiffs in the case (firm W). An additional $20,000 was al-
lowed the attorneys for the receiver.
Case No. 129: Another example of fees eating up assets. The
defendant company was in the laundry business. An at-
torney was appointed receiver, and at the same time an at-
torney for the receiver was appointed. Yet the total assets
amounted to but $631, out of which the receiver, the attorney
for the receiver, the attorneys for the plaintiff, the attorney
for the defendant, and the attorneys for the intervenors
were each allowed a sum of $75, or a total of $375 distributed
among five groups of attorneys.
Case No. 136: A good example of "lawyer-control." The plaintiff
was a lawyer, and was represented in court by a member of
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his firm. The same firm likewise represented the defendant,
a hotel-operating company. The defendant consented to the
receivership. The plaintiff was appointed receiver, and his
attorney was made attorney for the receiver. The receiver
was allowed a fee of $1,500, and his attorney (member of
the receiver's law firm) was allowed $2,500. In addition, the
receiver's law firm was allowed a fee of $245 for represent-
ing the defendant in the case.
Case No. 159: The receiver in this case served exactly 27 days,
at the end of which time he turned over the assets in his hands(consisting of $1,614 in cash and a stock of merchandise) to
the federal receiver in bankruptcy. For these services and
the services of the attorneys for the receiver (firm W, which
had appeared only as attorney for the petitioner and had
never been formally appointed by the court to act as attorney
for the receiver) the court made an allowance of $3,000.
(Judge L.)
Case No. 259: In this case a lawyer and . broker, acting as re-
ceivers, operated a building for a period of four months, dur-
ing which time their receipts amounted to $10,906. For these
services they were paid $7,500, and an additional sum of$1,000 was allowed to the two attorneys for the receivers.(Fees allowed by Judge D.)
Case No. 337: Another example of fees being out of proportion
to assets realized. The total assets realized were $1,223.
Out of this the receiver-an attorney by profession-was al-
lowed $312, the attorney for the plaintiffs $300, and the at-
torney for the defendant $150. Appraisers in the case re-
ceived $30, and auctioneers $120, with the result that out of
the total $1,223 of assets, $977 or about 80 per cent were
consumed by fees and administrative costs. Defendant filed
a motion to set aside the allowances as excessive, but his
motion was overruled.
Case No. 376: An excellent example of a "fat" receivership. The
defendant company was a large brokerage house. The plain-
tiff was an attorney who represented himself as holding a
claim of $1,000 against the defendant. He was represented
in court by law firm W. The answer of the defendant, ad-
mitting most of the allegations in the petition and consenting
to the appointment of receivers, was filed on the same day
that the petition was filed; on the same day the court(Judge A) appointed two receivers-one a lawyer, asso-
ciated with law firm W, and the other a broker. The court
also appointed a special master, a referee, and a substitute-
referee. Most of the fees were agreed to by a stipulation.
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These fees were as follows: To law firm W, for services as
attorney for the plaintiff-$50,000; to the receivers, one of
whom was associated with law firm W, $20,000; to the at-
torneys for the receivers, one of whom had represented the
defendant, $4,500; to the special master, referees, and other
attorneys in the case, $13,150. The receivership lasted
about 11 months, during which time the receivers filed ex-
actly four reports, of which only the last contained a state-
ment of receipts and disbursements. The principal asset
received by the receivers during the time of their administra-
tion of the estate seems to have been a sum of $275,000 in cash
received from the reorganization group to which the business
was finally transferred.
Case No. 384: Two receivers were appointed, one of them an at-
torney; and two attorneys for the receivers were appointed.
The business in receivership was a small hotel. The gross
receipts during the receivership were $990, plus $2,000 re-
ceived from the sale of the property. The receivers, attorneys
for receivers, and attorney for plaintiff were allowed $1,250.
Case No. 389: The court (Judge A) appointed two receivers, and
four attorneys for the receivers. These appointments were
made after the Circuit Court of St. Louis County had already
appointed a receiver over the same estate.
Case No. 390: The estate in receivership consisted of an apart-
ment house, against which foreclosure proceedings were be-
ing threatened. The only function of the receivers seems to
have been to collect the rents until the property could be sold.
The court (Judge A) appointed two receivers, one of them
an attorney, and three attorneys for the receivers. The rents
collected during the receivership amounted to $2,642, of
which the receivers and attorneys for receivers received
$1,750.
Case No. 394: The same type of case as 390, above. Judge A ap-
pointed two receivers, one of them an attorney, and three at-
torneys for receivers. Subesquently Judge B appointed an
additional attorney for receivers, as well as a successor to
to one of the original receivers and a successor to one of the
original attorneys for receivers.
Case No. 474: This case involved a receivership for a life insur-
ance company. The receivership lasted 15 days. Firm W
was appointed attorneys for the receiver (the State Superin-
tendent of Insurance). The only document filed in the case
by firm W was a motion for an allowance of a fee for the
services rendered by it during the period of 15 days. Judge G
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made the allowance-$20,000. The attorneys for the plain-
tiff got an equal amount.
Case No. 551: Another example of a case that properly belonged
in the Bankruptcy Court. The creditors' claims amounted to
$5,873. The total assets realized were $568, of which every
dollar was consumed by administrative expenses. The suit
was brought by a stockholder, who alleged gross mismanage-
ment on the part of the officers, and asked for an accounting
and a winding-up of the business by a receiver.
Case No. 565: As receivers for a retail shoe store, the court
(Judge C) here appointed two attorneys, and in addition ap-
pointed an attorney for the receivers. The business was
finally adjudicated bankrupt.
Case No. 651: The court here (Judge B) appointed two attorneys
to operate a small household supplies manufacturing com-
pany, as well as two attorneys foi the receivers. The estate
ended up in bankruptcy.
B. PENDING CASES
Case No. 26: This receivership has been pending for more than
eight years. The defendant company is in the loan and in-
vestment business. Nine judges have at various times taken
jurisdiction over the case. The original judge in the case
(Judge P) appointed three receivers, two of them being law-
yers, and, in addition, three attorneys for the receivers. A
number of additional attorneys, acting as special counsel
and referees, have also been appointed from time to time.
Up to the time when this case was investigated, the receivers
had reported that the total assets realized by them amounted
to $168,041. Of this amount, more than $85,000 had already
been paid out as fees to the receivers and the various at-
torneys in the case. Applications are now pending for addi-
tional allowances.
Case No. 62: The receivership here was granted in April, 1926.
The last record entry in the case is dated June 6, 1926. The
case has never been heard on the merits, and the receiver to
date has filed no report of his activity.
Case No. 88: Receivership granted in June, 1926. Two attorneys
for the receiver were appointed. The business was sold by the
receiver in January, 1927, but nothing has been done since
that time. The court record discloses no reason why the case
was not terminated shortly after the sale, from which the
total proceeds were only $500.
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Case No. 167: At the time when this case was investigated, the
receivers had reported total receipts of $11,165. The allow-
ances granted by the court were as follows: $2,500 to the
two lawyers who were acting as receivers; $850 to the two
attorneys for receivers; $100 to a special counsel; and $250
each to the attorney for plaintiff and attorney for defendant.
Case No. 181: Two lawyers were appointed receivers to take over
the work that was being carried on by the officers of the de-
fendant company-a large candy manufacturing company-
in selling the assets, consisting chiefly of machinery used in
the manufacture of candy, and winding up the business. A
third lawyer was appointed to act as attorney for the two
attorney receivers.
Case No. 301: A beautiful example of lawyers jockeying for re-
munerative positions in a receivership. The original peti-
tion, which sought a receivership for the defendant loan
company and an accounting from certain individuals con-
nected with the management of the company, named two at-
torneys among the individual co-defendants. Shortly there-
after an amended petition was filed striking out the names
of these two defendant attorneys. On the same day the
defendant company withdrew the denial that it had pre-
viously filed in answer to the plaintiff's petition, and con-
sented to the appointment of a receiver. In accordance with
a stipulation signed by the attorneys for all the parties, one
of the original defendant attorneys was appointed receiver,
and the other defendant attorney together with the attorney
for the plaintiff were appointed attorneys for the receiver.
In making the allowances of fees, the court included an al-
lowance of $1,500 to the attorneys for the plaintiff as well
as an allowance of $1,000 to the attorneys for the defendant.
Case No. 316: Another good example of "lawyer-control." Two
lawyers, one of them a member of the firm representing the
defendant loan company, were appointed receivers. To act
as attorneys for these attorney-receivers, two large law
firms-one of them representing the plaintiff in the case-
were appointed at the same time. The estimated value of
the assets, as set forth by plaintiff's petition, amounted to
less than $20,000.
Case No. 367: Receivership of an automobile manufacturing
company. A lawyer was appointed receiver. Three lawyers
were appointed to act as attorneys for the receiver. In ad-
dition, a fifth lawyer was appointed to act as "special coun-
sel" for the prosecution of some claims against former offi-
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cers of the company, and a sixth attorney was appointed to
hear and determine certain other disputed claims. At the
date when this case was investigated, the receivers had re-
ported that they had thus far realized a little more than
$80,000. Out of that sum, the court had already allowed
$15,000 to the receiver and $5,000 to the special counsel. The
other attorneys had not yet applied for allowances.
Case No. 369: Receivership of a loan company. Two lawyers
appointed receivers, and three lawyers appointed as attor-
neys for these attorney-receivers. After more than a year in
office, the receivers reported that they 'had succeeded in re-
alizing assets amounting to $350. (Judge B made the ap-
pointments.)
Case No. 371: To collect some rents pendente lite, the court
(Judge D) appointed a lawyer and an Assistant Chief of the
St. Louis Fire Department as co-receivers, and two attorneys
for these receivers. The rents collected by the receivers
amounted to about $400 per month.
Case No. 379: Receivership of a loan company. Two lawyers
were appointed receivers, as well as two attorneys for the
receivers. Total receipts reported after two years of re-
ceivership administration amount to $2,739.
Case No. 381: The attorneys who represented the defendant
company were appointed attorneys for the receivers, and
were given substantial allowances for their services in each
capacity.
Case No. 396: After six months of service as attorneys for the
receiver of an automobile manufacturing company, these at-
torneys were given an allowance of $15,000, and have motions
pending for additional allowances for later services.
Case No. 442: Another example of jockeying by lawyers for re-
munerative positions. Suit for an equitable foreclosure of a
deed of trust on a large hotel was filed by the trustees. Law
firm W applied for leave to intervene on behalf of certain
stockholders in the defendant company, alleging incompe-
tency and mismanagement on the part of the trustees, and
asking for the appointment of receivers to take charge of the
hotel and the removal of the trustees. While this application
was still pending, the same law firm appeared as intervenors
in behalf of certain bondholders, and again prayed for the
removal of the trustees and the appointment of receivers in
their place. At the hearing, the attorneys for the trustees
objected to the appearance of firm W in the dual and incon-
sistent capacities of attorneys for both stockholders and
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bondholders; whereupon firm W withdrew its intervening
petition in behalf of the stockholders and proceeded solely
in behalf of the bondholders whom it represented. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court removed one of the two
trustees and appointed a lawyer in his place. This implied
of course that the new trustee and the remaining original
trustee were regarded by the court as competent to act as
trustees. Nevertheless, the court then proceeded-without
any application being made by the trustees-to appoint two
receivers to take over the management of the hotel. One of
the attorneys appointed to act as attorneys for the receivers
was a member of firm W. (Judge C handled the case.)
Case No. 452: A substantial fee was allowed not only to the at-
torney for the plaintiff but also to the attorney for the
defendant company "for bringing the fund into court." Both
of these attorneys were appointed attorneys for the receiv-
ers in the case, and received additional substantial fees for
their services in that capacity.
Case No. 461: The petition asked for but one receiver, alleging
that one would be sufficient. The court (Judge A) neverthe-
less appointed two receivers (both lawyers) and two attor-
neys for the receivers. The inventory made by the receivers
estimated the total assets to be worth less than $15,000.
Case No. 560: The person appointed receiver had been named as
an individual co-defendant who allegedly had been partly re-
sponsible for the depletion of the assets available to the cred-
itors of the defendant company. If the allegations in the
petition are well-founded it would mean that the receiver
would have to proceed against himself to recover the assets
wrongfully taken by him. A motion is now pending to have
the receiver removed for that reason.
Case No. 587: The estate involved consisted of an apartment
house. Judge B appointed a member of the law firm repre-
senting the defendant as one of two co-receivers, and ap-
pointed three attorneys for the receivers, one of them being
another member of the law firm representing the defendant.
Case No. 630: A flagrant example of a case that properly be-
longed to the Bankruptcy Court being administered through
receivership proceedings in Equity. The petition admitted
that the sole purpose of the receivership was to shield the
company against threatened suits by numerous creditors.
There were no allegations of mismanagement or any other
recognized grounds for an equitable receivership. The de-
fendant company consented to the receivership, and recom-
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mefided the appointment of one receiver, and of one of the
attorneys for the plaintiff as attorney for the receiver. How-
ever, the court (Judge A) appointed two attorneys for the
receiver, an action which was subsequently criticized by thejudge (Judge B) who later presided in the case. The unse-
cured claims in this case amounted to more than $11,000.
The total receipts reported by the receiver from the sale of
the business amounted to but $1,750, out of which the re-
ceiver was allowed $500, the attorneys for the receiver an
equal amount, and the accountants $275.
Case No. 658: A unique case-the receiver, appointed to take
charge of a large apartment building, agreed to serve without
compensation.
CONCLUSIONS
In the opinion of the writer, the material contained in the fore-
going study leads to the following conclusions:
1. The large percentage of cases in which a receivership was
granted and the small percentage of cases in which the court de-
nied the petition for a receivership, leave considerable doubt as
to whether some of the judges have given sufficient heed to the
following generally accepted rule for the guidance of judges in
the exercise of their discretionary power to grant receiverships:
"The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one- (which)
should be exercised sparingly, with caution and circumspec-
tion, and only in an extreme case, under extraordinary cir-
cumstances, or under such circumstances as demand or re-
quire summary relief."15
2. The large number of cases in which a receiver was appointed
without a hearing leaves considerable doubt as to whether some
of the judges have given sufficient heed to the following generally
accepted rule:
"A receiver may be properly appointed without notice, and
before giving the adverse party an opportunity to be heard,
in, and only in, an extreme and exceptional case, in which
there is a great emergency and an imperious and most
stringent necessity for an immediate appointment, as where
the adverse party is out of the jurisdiction of the court or
cannot be found and served with notice, or, for some other
15 53 Corpus Juris 33-34, reiterated on numerous occasions by the appelate
courts of Missouri.
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reason, it is absolutely and imperatively necessary for the
court to interfere, before the lapse of time required to give
notice and afford a hearing, in order to prevent loss, waste,
destruction, irreparable injury, or the defeat of the peti-
tioner's rights, or the giving of notice would jeopardize the
delivery, safety, custody, or control of the property over
which the receivership is to be extended, and the rights of the
complaining party may be amply and sufficiently protected
in no other way, or by no other remedy, such as a temporary
injunction or restraining order."'16
3. A study of the petitions on which receiverships have been
grunted raises considerable doubt as to whether some of the
judges have paid sufficient attention to the generally accepted re-
quirements with respect to the interest and purpose of the peti-
tioner seeking a receivership. Particular laxity seems to have
been shown in allowing a receivership at the suit of a stockholder
whose own allegations indicated that the defendant company was
insolvent and that, consequently, he had no beneficial interest
that could be preserved or enforced through the receivership; in
allowing a receivership at the suit of a simple contract creditor
whose petition stated no recognized ground for equitable relief to
which the receivership would be ancillary; and in allowing a re-
ceivership where the petition on its face showed that the sole
and actual purpose of the suit was to close out and liquidate the
defendant company.
4. The large number of cases in which the defendant company
consented to the receivership and the subsequent history of such
cases would seem to indicate that receivership proceedings are
often regarded and intended to function as a voluntary process of
judicial liquidation, in lieu-and frequently in avoidance of liqui-
dation through bankruptcy proceedings.
5. Laying aside the question of the legal propriety of making
receivership proceedings serve as a substitute for liquidation
through bankruptcy, it is highly questionable whether from an
economic point of view such substitution is desirable. Although
no attempt has been made in this study to compare the losses suf-
fered by creditors in receivership liquidations with the losses suf-
fered by creditors in bankruptcy liquidations, the records reveal
16 53 Corpus Juris 59-60, quoted and approved by the Supreme Court of
Missouri in State ex rel. Kopke v. Mulloy, 329 Mo. 1, 10.
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at least two important reasons for believing that receivership
liquidation tends to be costlier to creditors than bankruptcy liqui-
dation. These are: (1) the unregulated practice of dispensing
fees in receivership cases; and (2) the lack of control exercised
by creditors in receivership cases.
6. The large percentage of cases in which practicing lawyers
have been appointed receivers-not merely to wind up but fre-
quently to operate business ranging from chop suey restaurants
to large theaters, hotels, and manufacturing companies-leaves
considerable doubt as to whether the judges have always given
serious heed to the generally accepted rule that in selecting a -e-
ceiver the court should-
"give due consideration not only to his quality of indifference,
but also to his business ability and his fitness with respect to
the character of the property which is to come under his care
and the duties he will be required to perform in its manage-
ment and conservation."17
Additional doubt as to the judges' recognition of this rule is cre-
ated by the numerous cases in which the receiver appointed was
neither a lawyer nor one whose trade or business was even re-
motely connected with the particular trade or business involved
in the receivership.
7. The frequency with which the court has appointed attorneys
for receivers simultaneously with its appointment of the receiv-
ers, and particularly the great number of cases in which attorneys
were appointed for receivers who were themselves lawyers-
often two large law firms for receivers who were themselves at-
torneys-raise a serious question not only as to the necessity of
such appointments in particular cases but as to the propriety of
such a practice in general.
8. With respect to evidence of concentration of receivership
litigation in the hands of certain law firms, it was found that four
firms showed a somewhat conspicuous record of involvement in
such litigation, but the character of such involvement, i. e. the
capacities in which each appeared most frequently, must be taken
into consideration before any foundation for criticism of these
firms can be laid down. Thus, whereas one of these firms-second
in number of cases-appeared far more often for the purpose of
3. 53 Cbrpus Juris 70.
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resisting the application for receivership, another firm-first in
number of cases-represented the party seeking the receivership
more than three times as often as it appeared in the capacity of
attorney for defendant, and, in addition, apparently received a
much greater sum for fees than all three of the other firms put
together.
9. The great length of time that elapsed in a number of cases
after all activity of the receiver had ceased and no apparent rea-
son existed for the pendency of the receivership, would seem to
indicate considerable laxity on the part of the court in its super-
vision of receivership cases.
10. The inadequate and unsatisfactory reports of the receivers
in many of the cases, particularly with respect to the financial
matters in the case, strongly suggest the advisability of having a
special officer of the Court of Equity to act as a sort of Master or
Referee in Receiverships, whose principal duty would be to check
over all reports of receivers and recommend their approval or dis-
approval by the Court.
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